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ABSTRACT 7 
Introduction: The efficiency-frontier approach (EFA) to health economic evaluation aims to 8 
benchmark the relative efficiency of new drugs with the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios 9 
(ICERs) of non-dominated comparators. By explicitly considering any differences in health 10 
outcomes and costs, it enhances the internal reference pricing (IRP) policy that was officially 11 
endorsed by Germany as the first country worldwide in 1989. However, the EFA has been 12 
repeatedly criticized since its official endorsement in 2009. 13 
Areas covered: This perspective aims to stimulate the debate by discussing whether the main 14 
objections to the EFA are technically valid, irrespective of national contextual factors in 15 
Germany with the reservations towards using a cost-per-quality-adjusted life year (QALY) 16 
threshold. Moreover, we comparatively assessed whether the objections are truly unique to 17 
the EFA or apply equally to IRP and cost-effectiveness thresholds. 18 
Expert commentary: The plethora of objections to the EFA (n=20) has obscured that many 19 
objections are neither technically valid nor unique to the EFA. Compared to cost-effectiveness 20 
thresholds, only two objections apply uniquely to the EFA and concern intended key 21 
properties: (1) no external thresholds are needed; and (2) the EFA is sensitive to price changes 22 
of comparators. Combining these policies and developing them further are under-utilized 23 
research areas. 24 
Keywords: reference pricing; cost effectiveness; health technology assessment; economic 25 
evaluation; decision making 26 
27 
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 28 
Internationally, various pharmaceutical policies aim to balance the access to drugs, ensure 29 
their quality, and control the growth of the drug expenditures [1, 2]. In this Perspective 30 
Article, we focus on pricing policies adopted by policy makers and third-party payers, 31 
particularly the practice of benchmarking drug prices by means of internal (i.e., domestic) 32 
reference pricing, to which the efficiency-frontier approach (EFA) can be seen as an 33 
extension. We believe that the plethora of objections to the EFA has obscured the strengths 34 
and limitations of the approach. This is why the main body of this Perspective Article will aim 35 
to stimulate the debate by scrutinizing the various objections voiced against the EFA on their 36 
merits, irrespective of national contextual factors. However, we acknowledge that some of the 37 
confusion can be attributed to the national setting of Germany, which originally proposed the 38 
EFA and has officially endorsed it as the only country so far, and that is why we will frame 39 
the main body of this Perspective Article within the German context and draw conclusions for 40 
other countries. 41 
To begin with, Germany was the first country in the world to introduce internal reference 42 
pricing (IRP) to achieve transparency between similar drugs and to curb their expenditures to 43 
an equivalent level in January 1989 [3, 4]. At first, IRP meant clustering drugs with the same 44 
active ingredient in the domestic market to determine a common price level per cluster, which 45 
was subsequently extended to drugs regarded as therapeutically equivalent in 1991 [4, 5]. 46 
From 1996 onwards, all newly marketed, patented drugs were excluded from IRP in Germany 47 
to protect the pharmaceutical industry, which led to the launch of many drugs with only minor 48 
modiﬁcation (so-called “me-too” drugs); consequently, patented drugs without additional 49 
therapeutic benefit were included in IRP again in 2004 [4]. Three years later, in 2007, the 50 
legal framework for pharmacoeconomic evaluations was enacted with the explicit aim of 51 
assessing the prices of new interventions to inform maximum reimbursable price [6, 7], thus 52 
intending a policy applicable to all newly marketed drugs again, including those with 53 
additional therapeutic benefit. 54 
When the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG), Germany’s main 55 
health technology assessment (HTA) agency, was tasked with developing a suitable method to 56 
inform maximum reimbursable prices within the stipulated framework, the quality-adjusted 57 
life year (QALY) was not promoted to the primary endpoint of interest as in other 58 
jurisdictions [8, 9]. The main reasons were ethical, methodological and legal concerns about 59 
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using QALYs [10], and the absence of a reasonably determined, justified and officially 60 
recognized cost-per-QALY-threshold [11, 12]. Instead, national consultations were held and 61 
the advice of an international expert panel sought [13], which led to adopting the so-called 62 
“efficiency-frontier approach” (EFA) in 2009 [14]. The EFA aims to explicitly consider the 63 
different therapeutic values and costs of comparable interventions in an economic evaluation 64 
to assess interventions’ prices (note: since 2011 the approach could be used in Germany to 65 
inform price negotiations if opted for by either the manufacturer or payer [15, 16]). However, 66 
with the law referring twice to the international standards of health economics, in which the 67 
theorems of resource allocations and health maximization are deeply rooted, the confusion 68 
was made perfect as to whether or not IQWiG’s aim is, or indeed should be, to maximize 69 
health through resource allocation [10]. Moreover, IQWiG does not have the legal remit to 70 
prioritize funds across disease areas [12], nor is such prioritization currently a primary aim or 71 
concern of Germany’s health policy (no fixed ex-ante budget exists for health-care 72 
expenditures of a given year; the Social Health Insurance funds may simply choose to 73 
increase levies the following year to balance their accounts). 74 
With the efficiency-frontier approach having been criticized ever since its official 75 
endorsement, we took the opportunity of it now being 10 years since introducing the legal 76 
framework for pharmacoeconomic evaluations in Germany, and about 30 years since 77 
introducing IRP, to place the most common objections to the efficiency-frontier approach into 78 
perspective. To stimulate the debate, we aimed to disentangle the German context from the 79 
efficiency-frontier approach as an analytical tool by reviewing common objections on (1) 80 
whether they are technically valid, irrespective of national contextual factors. Moreover, we 81 
explored whether the objections are truly unique to the efficiency-frontier approach by also 82 
checking whether they applied to (2) the “blunt” alternative of IRP [17], and (3) the often 83 
heard suggestion of using an externally set cost-effectiveness threshold (range).  84 
Section 2 will outline a brief theoretical background on each of the three policy alternatives in 85 
their function as potential pricing tools for decision makers like third-party payers. We will 86 
thus not predetermine the objectives of the decision maker, other than comparing the relative 87 
prices (or ratios) of interventions. Section 3 details how we identified objections and against 88 
which criteria we assessed them. Section 4 provides our assessment of the objections based 89 
against the theoretical background outlined in section 2 and the much more detailed 90 
references there within. Section 5 draws four conclusions from having assessed the 91 
objections. Section 6 will provide some commentary on the German context given that the 92 
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EFA has been officially endorsed only in Germany, while section 7 will identify learning 93 
points and a way forward for international settings alike. 94 
2. (NOT TOO) TECHNICAL BACKGROUND ON REFERENCE PRICING, 95 
COST-EFFECTIVENESS THRESHOLDS, AND THE EFFICIENCY 96 
FRONTIER APPROACH 97 
Generally, reference pricing is a cost-containment policy that aims to stimulate price 98 
competition between manufacturers of interventions that have been classified as substitutes 99 
based on chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic equivalence [4, 18]. Interventions are 100 
clustered together into one group, for which a maximum reimbursement level is set as the 101 
reference price for all interventions within that group (often based on the price of the cheapest 102 
intervention, or an average or proportion of existing prices [17]). Manufacturers are still free 103 
to set the price of an intervention independently, but the difference of the price and the 104 
maximum reimbursement limit is then to be paid out-of-pocket by the patients [18, 19]. 105 
Although prices of interventions are often also compared internationally (known as external 106 
reference pricing, ERP), it is the comparison of interventions available domestically, i.e. 107 
internal reference pricing (IRP) [19], that is in the focus of this paper. For an illustration of 108 
IRP see Figure 1A. 109 
Incremental cost-effectiveness thresholds may be seen as representing a pre-defined 110 
willingness-to-pay for a given unit of effect, the implied cut-off when the maximum budget 111 
was to be exhausted, or they may be inferred from previous reimbursement decisions [18, 20, 112 
21]. We will concentrate on the often-cited cost-per-QALY threshold approach as applied in 113 
England [8], which has been implied to be a suitable alternative to the EFA [22-25]. 114 
Incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) above the upper-bound cost-effectiveness 115 
threshold (of e.g. £20,000–£30,000/QALY in England) suggest that further arguments are 116 
needed to support reimbursing the launch price of an intervention as proposed by a 117 
manufacturer, while ICERs below the lower-bound threshold are generally considered cost-118 
effective. Moreover, the threshold can be used to benchmark interventions by adjusting the 119 
price of an intervention until the ICER meets the cost-effectiveness threshold [26, 27]; see 120 
Figure 1B. 121 
The efficiency-frontier approach can best be illustrated within a cost-effectiveness plane, 122 
which visualizes the costs and health benefits of all relevant interventions on two axes. All 123 
interventions that are not subject to simple or extended dominance are connected in an 124 
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ascending order of effectiveness. The resulting curve consists solely of efficient interventions; 125 
see Figure 1C. It thereby aids in determining the most appropriate, i.e. non-dominated, 126 
comparator of an intervention in an economic evaluation. 127 
[Figure 1 about here] 128 
The efficiency-frontier approach extends this concept by differentiating between comparators 129 
and (new) interventions under investigation, and drawing the curve of the efficiency frontier 130 
solely based on the comparators [15]. With the efficiency-frontier approach, a reimbursable 131 
price for the (new) intervention under assessment must then be set in such a way that the 132 
associated costs and effects come to lie on the curve; see Figure 1D. In case the benefit of the 133 
(new) intervention exceeds the highest benefit established with the comparators, the last 134 
segment of the efficiency frontier is linearly extrapolated, hence using the same trade-off rate 135 
for costs and health effects as for the most effective efficient comparator relative to the second 136 
most effective efficient comparator; cf. dashed line in Figure 1D. Consequently, an increase in 137 
effectiveness is valued by using the observed trade-off between costs and effects of the non-138 
dominated comparators, which has been called a “proportional rule” [28]. 139 
The efficiency-frontier approach is thus intended to provide guidance to decision makers in 140 
determining by how much the price of an intervention needs to be adjusted for it to become 141 
part of the curve of the non-dominated comparators [13]. Clearly, the same idea is realizable 142 
with an exogenously set incremental cost-effectiveness threshold, as occasionally done in 143 
England [26, 27]. 144 
3. IDENTIFYING AND ASSESSING OBJECTIONS 145 
We searched for objections to the efficiency-frontier approach by means of a pragmatic 146 
systematic literature review in PubMed and Embase (last search date 03.08.2015). Free text 147 
terms used were (cost benefit* and iqwig”) as well as (frontier and (efficiency or approach* or 148 
method*)). We used further search techniques like the “similar articles” function in PubMed 149 
and forward citation searching in Web of Science and Google Scholar using relevant articles 150 
known beforehand. Inclusion criteria were publications with objections to the efficiency 151 
frontier, written in English or German. In addition, we considered all objections to the 152 
efficiency-frontier approach raised by stakeholders during the formal hearing of IQWiG’s 153 
first-ever health economic evaluation on antidepressants [22, 29]. 154 
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We provide for each objection a short statement summarizing its key concern in quotation 155 
marks, followed by the result of our assessment in three steps: (1) We assessed the technical 156 
validity of each objection with regard to the efficiency-frontier approach. Here, we define 157 
“technically valid” as representing a sound attribute or comment on the efficiency-frontier 158 
approach as a decision tool that applies to the proposed concept within the theoretical 159 
framework outlined above in section 2, independent of any national context. Moreover, we 160 
assessed whether the objection is truly unique to the efficiency-frontier approach by also 161 
considering the “technical validity” of the objection for (2) internal reference pricing (IRP), 162 
which can be seen as the historical context leading to the EFA in Germany, and (3) the cost-163 
per-QALY threshold, which has been proposed by many stakeholders as an alternative to the 164 
EFA [22-25]. If relevant, we separated considering the cost-effectiveness threshold (CET) as 165 
a hard-decision rule from its use as a benchmark for the (value-based) price level of 166 
interventions with regards to the threshold (i.e., adjusting the price until the ICER meets the 167 
cost-effectiveness threshold) [26, 27]. 168 
In cases where an objection also applied to the two alternative approaches (i.e., IRP and 169 
CET), we concluded that the objection was not truly unique to the efficiency-frontier 170 
approach. Otherwise, we concluded that it was truly unique to the efficiency-frontier 171 
approach. 172 
All three policy options have been assessed from the viewpoint of decision makers like third-173 
party payers/insurers, as originally intended for the EFA. Hence, we are comparing the three 174 
policy options with regard to their ability of being drug pricing tools, not in terms of resource 175 
allocation tools. Also, we compared each policy as an independent option without 176 
complementing each other, while section 5 discusses potential combinations.  177 
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4. OUR ASSESSMENT OF OBJECTIONS 178 
The systematic literature search identified 39 publications that fulfilled the study inclusion 179 
criteria. In addition, we considered the formal comments of 8 stakeholders (i.e., five 180 
pharmaceutical companies, two pharmaceutical industry associations, and one health 181 
economics society) [22]. In total, 20 distinctive objections to the efficiency-frontier approach 182 
were raised, which included topics on allocation (n=4), comparators (n=2), endpoints (n=3), 183 
input parameters (n=4), the practical implementation (n=3), and the epistemological roots 184 
(n=4). For an overview of our assessment of objections see Table 1. 185 
[Table 1 about here] 186 
4.1 Objection 1: “The approach avoids externally set cost-effectiveness thresholds.“ 187 
[22] 188 
EFA: Valid. The efficiency-frontier approach does not require any externally set cost-189 
effectiveness thresholds as it derives flexible thresholds from the incremental cost-190 
effectiveness ratios of the non-dominated comparators analyzed (which, in turn, constitute the 191 
segments of the curve of the efficiency frontier) [13, 15]. 192 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing schemes do not use or require cost-effectiveness thresholds 193 
given their exclusive focus on prices once interventions have been classified as equivalent 194 
[17, 18]. 195 
CET: Invalid. By default, cost-effectiveness thresholds require an exogenously set and 196 
explicit incremental cost-effectiveness threshold (range) to allow making any statements 197 
about interventions being cost-effective [30]. 198 
4.2 Objection 2: “The approach does not prioritize funds across disease areas.” [22-199 
25] 200 
EFA: Invalid. The efficiency-frontier approach aims to limit the expenditure of (new) 201 
interventions to an amount justified by the available comparators [6, 7], thereby prioritizing 202 
funds implicitly by restricting funding in one area that are freed up for another. By 203 
considering any subtle differences in health outcomes explicitly, however, the efficiency-204 
frontier approach improves the rather “blunt” IRP schemes [17]. Nonetheless, the focus of the 205 
EFA rests on pharmaceutical pricing within disease areas and not on an intentional, deliberate 206 
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way of prioritizing resources across disease areas explicitly. When employing the EFA in 207 
isolation, without a subsequent appraisal, the slope of the efficiency frontier in a disease area 208 
may thus be a potentially historical chance result (cf. objection 10 and 11). In our opinion, the 209 
absence of enough comparators to draw a frontier can be regarded as an indicator for the need 210 
of prioritization in its own right; cf. rare diseases. Lastly, the explicit use of the EFA to 211 
prioritize funds across disease areas requires a similar comparison across endpoints, e.g. with 212 
some form of aggregated measure of outcomes (cf. objections 7 and 8).  213 
IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing aims to limit the expenditure on interventions in indications 214 
for which comparable alternatives exist; as such, funds are prioritized on disease areas with 215 
fewer alternatives, if at all available [18]. Similar to the EFA, reference pricing can only be 216 
applied with sufficient comparators. 217 
CET: Invalid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds aim to maximize health by prioritizing funds to 218 
disease areas where the most QALYs are gained, irrespective of whom [31]. In practice, this 219 
aim may not be achieved, particularly when used only as a funding threshold that ignores the 220 
related issues of affordability and the budget impact [32-34]. 221 
4.3 Objection 3: “The approach does not represent societal preferences or the 222 
maximum willingness-to-pay for new drugs.” [22-25] 223 
EFA: Valid. By default, the efficiency-frontier approach may not reflect the maximum 224 
willingness-to-pay of society, especially in disease areas with only generic competition [13]. 225 
When based on the price level of patented comparators, however, the slope of the last segment 226 
of the frontier may at least reveal the current willingness-to-pay of payers [13]. 227 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing likewise benchmarks the price of new drugs to existing 228 
comparable alternatives [18]. Nonetheless, the maximum reimbursement limit does not equate 229 
to the maximum willingness-to-pay as demonstrated by patients who are willing to make out-230 
of-pocket co-payments for the non-reimbursed price difference [4, 18]. 231 
CET: Valid. Ideally, cost-effectiveness thresholds represent the forgone opportunity costs, 232 
which is why e.g. the threshold proposal of the World Health Organization (WHO) based on a 233 
country’s gross domestic product has been heavily criticized for the missing link to actually 234 
displaced or unfunded services [34]. In practice, however, these thresholds rather often also 235 
reflect the willingness-to-pay of payers (most prominently seen for the threshold proposed for 236 
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the USA [21]), not necessarily societal preferences or their maximum willingness-to-pay for 237 
new drugs [35-37]. 238 
4.4 Objection 4: “The approach avoids explicitly rationing effective drugs on 239 
economic grounds.” [38] 240 
EFA: Valid. The efficiency-frontier approach avoids rationing effective drugs on economic 241 
grounds due to its aim of providing guidance on appropriate reimbursable prices in relation to 242 
existing comparators (which can be achieved by reducing the price of interventions whose 243 
effectiveness is lower than that of the comparators) [39]. The EFA has not been intended as a 244 
binary decision rule [13]. 245 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing also avoids rationing effective drugs on economic grounds by 246 
offering a lower reimbursed price, with any difference needed to be paid by patients [17, 18]. 247 
CET: Invalid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds could be used to ration effective but inefficient 248 
drugs on economic grounds [36], while using it to benchmark the price of an intervention for 249 
its ICER to meet the cost-effectiveness threshold may also avoid rationing effective drugs on 250 
economic grounds [26]. 251 
4.5 Objection 5: “The approach could be used with an inadequate comparator.” [22] 252 
EFA: Valid. The efficiency-frontier approach could lead to biased results when using an 253 
inadequate comparator [40]. However, as the approach is intended for multiple-technology 254 
assessments that include all relevant alternatives as possible comparators [13, 14], an 255 
intervention should inevitably be compared with the most efficient, non-dominated (and thus 256 
most adequate) comparators. 257 
IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing only applies to interventions once they have been classified as 258 
substitutes based on chemical, pharmacological or therapeutic equivalence [4, 18]. 259 
CET: Valid. Similar to the efficiency-frontier approach, using an inadequate comparator in 260 
the analysis could also lead to biased results with exogenously set cost-effectiveness 261 
thresholds [41]. The risk of choosing an inadequate intervention as comparator might even be 262 
higher when avoiding multiple-technology assessments [40]. 263 
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4.6 Objection 6: “The approach is open to manipulation by adding a ‘meaningless’ 264 
alternative to the market.” [22] 265 
EFA: Invalid. Given that the efficiency-frontier approach has been intended to assess the 266 
prices of new interventions, a newly marketed “alternative” was to be assessed itself, meaning 267 
that it should not be considered for the efficiency frontier of non-dominated comparators [13, 268 
14]. A newly added “alternative” could only affect the slope of the curve if it was 269 
misclassified as a comparator [40], and even then only if it became a constituting part of the 270 
frontier (cf. objection 5; for the related concern of strategic pricing of existing alternatives see 271 
objection 12). 272 
IRP: Valid. Any newly marketed “alternative” that is considered comparable to existing 273 
interventions was to be clustered with them, or it would enable clustering existing 274 
interventions [17]. As such, its price would potentially alter the reference price of that cluster 275 
[4]. 276 
CET: Invalid. Similar to the efficiency-frontier approach, a scientifically sound analysis based 277 
on a cost-effectiveness threshold was to use the newly marketed “alternative” as the main 278 
intervention of interest, not as the comparator [41]. 279 
4.7 Objection 7: “The approach purposely avoids using the QALY as an endpoint.” 280 
[42] 281 
EFA: Invalid. Drawing an efficiency frontier in a cost-effectiveness plane does not forestall 282 
the choice of health effects used [43, 44], and neither does the efficiency-frontier approach 283 
[13, 15]. It largely depends on the national context whether the QALY will be used as an 284 
endpoint, and particularly whether it is promoted to the primary endpoint of interest (cf. 285 
Introduction) [8, 9]. An overview of the strengths and limitations of the QALY is outside the 286 
scope of this Perspective Article and has been given elsewhere [31, 45]. 287 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing does not consider QALYs given the focus on prices once 288 
interventions have been classified as equivalent [17, 19]. 289 
CET: Invalid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds conventionally use an externally set cost-per-290 
QALY threshold, and thus do not avoid the QALY by default [45]. 291 
4.8 Objection 8: “The approach avoids aggregating endpoints.” [22] 292 
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EFA: Invalid. The efficiency-frontier approach could be used with aggregated endpoints such 293 
as the QALY [13, 15], or the results for different endpoints could be aggregated by means of 294 
multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) techniques [46, 47]. 295 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing does not consider aggregated endpoints given the focus on 296 
prices once interventions have been classified as equivalent [17, 19]. 297 
CET: Invalid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds conventionally use an externally set cost-per-298 
QALY threshold, and thus intentionally apply an aggregated endpoint by default [45]. 299 
4.9 Objection 9: “The approach requires cardinally-scaled endpoints.“ [22, 23] 300 
EFA: Valid. The efficiency-frontier approach requires cardinally-scaled endpoints, at least in 301 
the relevant area of analysis [48].  302 
IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing does not require cardinally-scaled endpoints given the focus 303 
on prices once interventions have been classified as equivalent [17, 19]. 304 
CET: Valid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds effectively also require cardinally-scaled 305 
endpoints, at least in the relevant area of analysis [45, 48]. 306 
4.10 Objection 10: “The approach does not consider life-cycles of on-patent drugs 307 
(from high prices to generic, and thus lower, prices) by comparing them to historic 308 
pricing decisions.” [22] 309 
EFA: Valid. The efficiency-frontier approach does not consider the life-cycle of drugs 310 
explicitly as the approach was intended for indication-specific analyses using the current 311 
prices of the existing alternatives [13]. However, it is not inherent to the approach but the 312 
context (and research question) whether the value of the price is chosen to be current, historic, 313 
or varying over time. 314 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing does not consider life-cycles of drugs given the focus on 315 
current prices at the time of establishing, or updating, a cluster of equivalent drugs [17, 19]. 316 
CET: Valid. Similar to the efficiency-frontier approach, life-cycles of drugs are usually not 317 
considered, with a rare example in Hoyle (2011) [49]. Implicitly, the fixed-threshold approach 318 
may consider historic pricing decisions when the thresholds are based on patented 319 
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interventions whose costs were previously accepted for reimbursement, but not necessarily 320 
when the threshold is based on e.g. the value of a statistical life [9]. 321 
4.11 Objection 11: “The approach does not properly acknowledge the research and 322 
development costs of drugs.” [22, 24, 25] 323 
EFA: Valid. The efficiency-frontier approach does not consider the research and development 324 
costs of drugs explicitly. When using it without a separate appraisal that addresses such 325 
additional concerns, disease areas where the prices of the comparators do not (even implicitly) 326 
reflect their research and development costs may be disadvantaged (e.g. indications with only 327 
generic comparators). 328 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing also does not consider the research and development costs of 329 
drugs explicitly, which, however, has not been shown to dis-incentivize pharmaceutical 330 
innovation [18]. 331 
CET: Valid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds also do not consider the research and development 332 
costs of drugs explicitly [21, 36]. Arguably, research and development costs are implicitly 333 
considered when the threshold is derived from past decisions for patented drugs. 334 
4.12 Objection 12: “The approach could be influenced by altering prices of 335 
interventions.” [42] 336 
EFA: Valid. The slope of the efficiency-frontier approach could be influenced by changes in 337 
the price of comparators (which may result in changes of uptake, and lower healthcare 338 
expenditures). However, this presumes for the price-changing company to know beforehand 339 
the price level (and associated costs) at which its intervention becomes part of the frontier 340 
without incurring substantial profit losses. It also needs to become part of that particular 341 
segment of the curve that is used for the assessment (given that the frontier may consist of 342 
more than one segment; cf. Figure 1D). If the comparator is owned by a different 343 
manufacturer it is not apparent why they would lawfully reduce the price (and voluntarily 344 
accept lower profits) to the advantage of a competitor. 345 
IRP: Valid. Given that the reference price is set based on the prices of the existing 346 
interventions in a cluster [17, 18], changing the price of existing interventions may impact the 347 
level of the price cap in a cluster. Moreover, there are strong incentives for manufacturers to 348 
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price their interventions at a higher level than they would have without being subjected to 349 
reference pricing [18]. 350 
CET: Invalid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds cannot be influenced by altering prices (as it is 351 
explicitly set ex ante), but the ICER can be influenced similarly through strategic price 352 
changes, which may lead to obtaining less QALYs from a fixed budget [26, 37]. 353 
4.13 Objection 13: “The approach requires data that may not always be available.” 354 
[22] 355 
EFA and CET: Valid. Adequate data are a universal requirement of scientifically sound 356 
analyses [41]. Nonetheless, key data on necessary input parameters may be missing for any 357 
given disease (in case no indirect treatment comparisons are possible), and the chance of data 358 
missing may increase with the number of interventions analyzed. 359 
IRP: Valid. Reference pricing can only be performed once sufficient interventions are 360 
available that can be classified as equivalent [18]. 361 
4.14 Objection 14: “The approach assumes constant returns to scale and perfect 362 
divisibility.” [50] 363 
EFA and CET: Valid. Assuming constant returns to scale (i.e. constant marginal health 364 
benefits of interventions, irrespective of the amount purchased) and perfect divisibility of 365 
interventions is a fundamental limitation of all continuous, linear thresholds [51]. 366 
IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing does not make these assumptions in the absence of a linear 367 
threshold and the focus on marginal unit prices [18]. 368 
4.15 Objection 15: “The approach is very onerous.” [22, 23] 369 
EFA: Invalid. The efficiency-frontier approach is intended to include all relevant 370 
interventions. However, the approach itself does not require unduly greater effort than any 371 
other health economic evaluation performed as a multiple technology assessment (cf. 372 
objection 13). Previous research also explored a “shortcut”-application of the efficiency-373 
frontier approach to allow for rapid assessments [52, 53]. 374 
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IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing is not very onerous given the exclusive focus on prices once 375 
interventions have been classified as equivalent [17, 18], which may arguably be the most 376 
onerous part. 377 
CET: Invalid. Like the efficiency-frontier approach, applying a cost-effectiveness threshold 378 
range is not the most onerous part of an economic evaluation; the complexity rather increases 379 
with the choice of the analysis, i.e. whether it is performed as multiple-technology assessment 380 
or single-technology assessment [17, 33]. 381 
4.16 Objection 16: “The approach could lead to negative ex-factory prices if all trade 382 
margins are deduced.” [22] 383 
EFA: Valid. If the efficiency-frontier approach let to recommend reducing the price of a drug, 384 
the price could become negative if the distance between the location of the intervention and 385 
the efficiency frontier was very large, indicating an intervention’s inefficiency in relation to 386 
the existing comparators. Any low price level could lead to negative prices if all trade margins 387 
were deduced, and if the results were implemented mindlessly without an appraisal. 388 
IRP: Valid. If a reimbursement cap based on reference pricing was to be set at very low 389 
levels, it is conceivable that ex-factory prices could become negative when deducing all trade 390 
margins. However, it has been observed that manufacturers anticipate this when pricing 391 
interventions potentially subjected to IRP [18]. 392 
CET: Invalid/Valid. Negative ex-factory prices do not occur for cost-effectiveness thresholds 393 
used as hard decision rule given that interventions with very high ICERs would be deemed 394 
cost-ineffective, and access to the market denied [54]. However, it obviously also applies to 395 
cost-effectiveness thresholds used to benchmark prices (when they need to be drastically 396 
reduced). 397 
4.17 Objection 17: “The approach deviates from international health economic 398 
standards.” [22-24] 399 
EFA: Invalid. Using an efficiency frontier to inform decision makers has been officially 400 
adopted in two other countries [55, 56], albeit not to benchmark prices as proposed with the 401 
efficiency-frontier approach in Germany [13, 15]. However, the comparison of ICERs from 402 
non-dominated comparators bears close resemblance to the comparison of the ICER for the 403 
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most expensive intervention funded in the USA [21], and the Programme Budgeting Marginal 404 
Analysis (PBMA) approach in Australia [33]. 405 
IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing of drugs has been conducted in domestic markets for nearly 406 
30 years [5], with at least 20 European countries using internal reference pricing [18]. 407 
CET: Invalid. Using cost-effectiveness thresholds to assess interventions’ cost-effectiveness 408 
has been applied for decades [23, 57], though it has become the national standard in only a 409 
few countries [9] and some see its importance diminishing [58], partly due to the issues 410 
associated with having one single metric that may not capture all relevant effects [20]. Using 411 
cost-effectiveness thresholds to benchmark prices (and costs) of interventions is seen rather 412 
critically by some [26, 27]. 413 
4.18 Objection 18: “The approach lacks theoretical embedding in economic theory.” 414 
[22, 50] 415 
EFA and CET: Invalid. The efficiency-frontier approach builds on the well-known concept of 416 
the efficiency frontier in (health) economics and decision sciences [43, 44, 59-64]. It is based 417 
on the same theoretical foundations as the fixed-threshold approach [65, 66]. 418 
IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing is based on the idea that similar goods with nearly identical 419 
characteristics (i.e. interventions classified as substitutes based on chemical, pharmacological 420 
or therapeutic equivalence [17, 18]) should be selling for the same price. 421 
4.19 Objection 19: “The approach lacks an international debate.” [22] 422 
EFA: Invalid. The efficiency-frontier approach was subjected to an extensive formal hearing 423 
organized by IQWiG in Germany in 2008, and since then the approach has been debated at 424 
national and international conferences and in scientific journals [13, 23-25, 38, 48, 52, 67-74].  425 
IRP: Invalid. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the 426 
WHO, the European Commission (EC), the Cochrane Collaboration and various academics 427 
have all discussed the advantages and disadvantages of reference pricing [2, 4, 17-19, 75]. 428 
CET: Invalid. Cost-effectiveness thresholds continue to be extensively debated, which has 429 
been ongoing for a much longer period of time [2, 18, 20, 32, 34, 36, 65]. 430 
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4.20 Objection 20: “The approach uses an arbitrary method to inform decision 431 
makers about uncertainty.” [22] 432 
EFA: Invalid. The efficiency-frontier approach has been suggested to be used in conjunction 433 
with the interquartile range of the recommended reimbursable price as an aid for subsequent 434 
price negotiations [29, 76], which has been misunderstood to be an aid to inform decision 435 
makers about uncertainty. Exploring uncertainty in the EFA is indeed an active research area; 436 
for the impact of uncertainty on the price recommendation see Corro Ramos et al. [77]. 437 
IRP: Invalid. Reference pricing does not inform decision makers about uncertainty given the 438 
focus on prices once interventions have been classified as equivalent [17, 19]. 439 
CET: Invalid. For cost-effectiveness thresholds, elaborate uncertainty analyses have been an 440 
important research area to inform decision makers [78, 79].  441 
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5. CONCLUSION 442 
Having assessed 20 objections to the efficiency-frontier approach, we found 11 objections 443 
that, in our opinion, could be classified as technically valid.  444 
Many of the objections aimed at properties of the efficiency-frontier approach that are 445 
intended to improve the existing reference pricing system in Germany by explicitly 446 
considering health endpoints (cf. objections 7-9). Compared to a cost-effectiveness threshold, 447 
only two objections are truly unique to the efficiency-frontier approach and concern intended 448 
key properties: 1) the efficiency-frontier approach does not require external thresholds due to 449 
being derived from existing comparators, and 2) the efficiency-frontier approach is thus 450 
supposed to be sensitive to price changes of comparators. 451 
Based on these findings, we draw the following four conclusions: First, a plethora of 452 
objections to the efficiency-frontier approach has been raised, with many applying equally to 453 
alternative policies and indeed any threshold approach. We appreciate that the relevance of 454 
(some of) the objections listed here may be questioned, which was meant to give a 455 
comprehensive overview of the criticism that the EFA has been attracting. Instead of 456 
speculating about the reasons why this has been happening, we merely opted to assess 457 
whether the objections actually have some technical merit. Knowing that the topic, the EFA 458 
and these “objections” may be considered controversial by some, we have thus opted for a 459 
Perspective Article. 460 
Second, there appear to us to be fewer differences between the efficiency-frontier approach 461 
and a cost-effectiveness threshold than may be suggested by the sheer amount of objections. 462 
While we acknowledge that there may be disagreement with our assessment and some, or 463 
indeed all, of the objections may be judged differently by researchers in terms of their 464 
“technical validity”, we have included our judgement as an anchor against which the public is 465 
invited to base his/her own judgement on. Overall, however, the key distinction between the 466 
EFA and CETs is by default their aim and how they reach it, although both approaches may 467 
arguably serve both purposes [28]: The efficiency-frontier approach has been intended for the 468 
assessment of prices by deriving flexible thresholds to benchmark the relative efficiency of 469 
(new) interventions; the fixed-threshold approach has been intended for judging on (new) 470 
interventions’ cost-effectiveness with implications for their reimbursement based on an 471 
external threshold (cf. objection 1 and 12).  472 
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Third, it seems important to stress that, unlike IRP, neither of the other two approaches bears 473 
the appraisal in itself nor qualifies for an automated reimbursement process (a 474 
misunderstanding shared by WHO’s threshold proposal; see Bertram et al. [34]). The primary 475 
aim of these approaches is to provide guidance to decision makers for a subsequent multi-476 
criteria appraisal, in which various factors in favor for and against reimbursing the launch 477 
price of an intervention are to be considered (including opportunity costs, potential 478 
weaknesses of the approaches for e.g. rare diseases [80, 81], and research and development 479 
costs; cf. objection 11). Any unfavorable assessment with either approach would thus 480 
highlight the need for additional arguments to support an intervention’s reimbursement (at a 481 
higher premium).  482 
Fourth, there is an under-utilized opportunity for researchers to develop policies further. For 483 
instance, in our view it would be worth exploring using historic market-entry prices within 484 
indications (cf. objection 10) or the on-patent prices across indications. Also, policies could 485 
be used simultaneously to complement each other, where the exogenous threshold may 486 
indicate health opportunity costs while the efficiency frontier approach may then indicate how 487 
the intervention compares to existing alternatives. 488 
6. EXPERT COMMENTARY 489 
Without the historical context of healthcare legislation in Germany set out in the introduction 490 
of this paper, it may be difficult to understand the reasons that led to the idea of the 491 
efficiency-frontier approach for reimbursement decision-making. When policy makers 492 
enacted the legal framework for health economic evaluations in Germany in 2007, they 493 
attempted to close a regulatory loophole for patented drugs that had not been covered by 494 
internal reference pricing since 1996 anymore. Moreover, the established reference pricing 495 
system was to be expanded (again) but this time informed by a much more elaborate process 496 
that explicitly considered any subtle differences in benefits and costs between interventions 497 
with additional therapeutic benefit. Accordingly, the approaches and standards valid in other 498 
countries with different legal and cultural contexts were not easily transferrable to the German 499 
setting [12]. Instead, the efficiency-frontier approach appears to have been responding closely 500 
to the ideas of the legal framework by combining the price efficiency of the reference pricing 501 
system (familiar in German reimbursement policy) with the explicit cost-to-benefit 502 
consideration of economic evaluations (unfamiliar in German reimbursement policy); it was 503 
thus striving to combine the best of both worlds. 504 
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From an international perspective, however, this pricing policy clashed with the alternatively 505 
used cost-effectiveness thresholds and the economic idea of resource allocation, and it led to 506 
the efficiency-frontier approach being widely opposed. This did not go unnoticed by German 507 
policy makers, and by 2011 they have had effectively adopted a reimbursement system based 508 
largely on comparative effectiveness when enacting the ‘Act on the Reform of the Market for 509 
Medicinal Products’ (AMNOG) [16]. Under this system, in brief, if a new drug is able to 510 
demonstrate an additional therapeutic benefit in randomized controlled trials to a (usually 511 
non-placebo) comparator, the manufacturer and the payer enter into price negotiations. 512 
Without such a proven additional therapeutic benefit, pricing of the new drug is capped at the 513 
price of the comparator (cf. IRP) [18]. If the manufacturer disagrees with the price cap, or 514 
negotiations fail, either party could ask for an economic evaluation being conducted to inform 515 
renewed price negotiations [82-84]. So far this has never happened, likely due to the 516 
disincentives for either party; payers benefit from lower prices of the “blunt” IRP system [17], 517 
while manufacturers face the entire financial burden when commissioning an economic 518 
evaluation of uncertain outcome to them and possibly negative impact in case a lower price 519 
was recommended. Thus, unsurprisingly, no economic evaluation has been commissioned 520 
since AMNOG was introduced in 2011 (as of June 2018) [85]. 521 
With it now being ten years since enacting the legal framework for health economic 522 
evaluations in Germany, the initial attempts to link health economic considerations to the drug 523 
pricing system must be judged as having failed; cost-effectiveness relationships play de-facto 524 
currently no role for drug pricing in Germany. However, evidence-based health technology 525 
assessments in the form of comparative effectiveness research have been successfully 526 
integrated in the reimbursement system since 2011 [82-84], providing a more structured 527 
system to investigate in potentially clustering drugs based on their health impact. From a 528 
societal perspective, it seems obvious to us that it would be desirable to have a similar 529 
rigorous system for the costs of drugs, and the relationship of cost-to-benefits between 530 
different drugs. For the time being, the optimists among us hence hope for health economic 531 
evaluation being only a “sleeping beauty” in Germany [85]. However, for as long as the 532 
financial and political pressure is not strong enough (as in the build up to the 1989 reform), 533 
the current system in Germany is unlikely to change soon. As such, the prices negotiated may 534 
only by chance reach a level considered appropriate [20, 86], which may raise avoidable 535 
opportunity costs.  536 
20 
 
7. FIVE-YEAR VIEW 537 
In 2019, it will be 30 years since Germany, as the first country, introduced internal reference 538 
pricing [3]. In general, Germany is a prime example for the international struggle of policy 539 
makers trying to find a way that determines appropriate prices for patented drugs while 540 
honoring the commitments of access, quality and price control. At this point, however, it 541 
seems highly desirable to us to include health economic considerations explicitly into the drug 542 
pricing and reimbursement system of any country to avoid ignoring the opportunity costs of 543 
funding decisions, and the relative differences in the achievable health and costs. At least 544 
three issues need to be reconsidered: 545 
1. While comparative effectiveness research remains undoubtedly pivotal for analyzing the 546 
therapeutic value of interventions, it should be the first step in a process complemented by 547 
analyzing the opportunity costs associated with the different benefits and expenditures of 548 
alternative therapies, particularly those currently not subjected to reference pricing (i.e., 549 
interventions with a proven additional therapeutic benefit). The Netherlands are a good 550 
example to show that combining these policies is feasible, as the reimbursement system 551 
established there complements reference pricing with cost-effectiveness analyses [17, 87]. 552 
2. Moreover, it will need sufficient political will to change the current system in order for 553 
society to benefit from cost-effectiveness considerations as a whole. To achieve this goal, the 554 
procedure for economic evaluations may need to change to raise the appeal and perceived 555 
usefulness for policy makers: The conventional IRP is conducted in Germany on an annual 556 
basis [82-84], while the comparative effectiveness assessment is usually also concluded 557 
within one year [85]. It will thus need a rapid assessment of the health economic aspects to 558 
appeal to decision makers, with a short-cut having been proposed before [52, 53]. Australia’s 559 
Programme Budgeting Marginal Analysis (PBMA) approach provides another example for a 560 
rigorous assessment system that suffices with a robust reference/base case, as adding further 561 
complexity to the analysis has seldom changed past funding decisions [33]. 562 
3. In addition, risk-sharing arrangements need to be explored so as to share the uncertainty 563 
associated with the financial burden of additional research among manufacturers and payers 564 
(as representatives of society) [88]. In Germany, for instance, manufacturers are currently 565 
obliged to pay for the economic evaluation if requested by them. This one-sided financing 566 
arrangement provides disincentives for both payer and manufacturers to commission 567 
economic evaluations, as the gains from the conventional IRP scheme seem to unduly 568 
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advantage the payer and disproportionately burden the manufacturers. One needs to bear in 569 
mind that neither the concentration of market power with the manufacturers in monopolies 570 
nor with the payers in monopsonies will lead to efficient prices [89]. It may thus indeed need 571 
more independent research with the necessary support to investigate in prices in the best 572 
interest of both industry and payers, which is ultimately to benefit society as a whole.  573 
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8. KEY ISSUES 574 
 The efficiency-frontier approach (EFA) benchmarks intervention’s prices based on the 575 
relative efficiency to comparators’ incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). 576 
 In Germany, the EFA can be regarded as following in the footsteps of internal 577 
reference pricing (IRP), a successful cost-containment strategy celebrating its 30
th
 578 
anniversary in 2019 that was once applicable to all drugs but has been excluding 579 
patented drugs with additional therapeutic benefit for 20 years since 1996. 580 
 The EFA aims to combine the savings achievable with IRP and the explicit 581 
consideration of cost-effectiveness ratios of economic evaluations, or indeed the best 582 
of both worlds, to inform drug pricing negotiations. 583 
 The plethora of objections to the EFA, however, has obscured that many objections 584 
are neither technically valid nor unique to the EFA. 585 
 There is an under-utilized opportunity to research into these policies to further develop 586 
them, e.g. by using them complementary where exogenous cost-effectiveness 587 
thresholds may indicate health opportunity costs while the EFA may indicate how the 588 
intervention compares to existing alternatives. 589 
 590 
  591 
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9. FIGURES 592 
 593 
Figure 1. Illustration of the different policies and approaches discussed in this Perspective 594 
Article for 8 interventions in a cost-effectiveness plane. Panel a): Internal reference pricing 595 
(IPR), with a set maximum price reimbursement level. This level could e.g. be based on an 596 
average, meaning that the price above the line is not paid for by third-parties; the new 597 
intervention 8 would either require copayments from patients or needing to reduce its price to 598 
the maximum reimbursement level. Panel b): Cost-effectiveness threshold (CET) applied 599 
incrementally to the new intervention 8 versus the most-appropriate comparator intervention 600 
7. The new intervention 8 is deemed cost-ineffective, and without additional arguments it 601 
becomes cost-effective only when reducing its price, i.e. shifting intervention 8 downwards 602 
until it lies on the cost-effectiveness threshold. Panel c): The curve of the efficiency frontier 603 
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indicates the non-dominated interventions. Panel d): Efficiency-frontier approach (EFA) as 604 
adopted by IQWiG , with inverted axes for the ease of comparison. Interventions 1 to 7 are 605 
used as comparators to assess the new intervention 8. The curve comprises the non-dominated 606 
comparators, with the slope of the last segment being extrapolated forward to account for the 607 
higher benefit achieved with the new intervention 8. In this example, the EFA would lead to 608 
the recommendation of a price reduction, i.e. shifting intervention 8 downwards until it lies on 609 
the efficiency frontier. Also note the potential pricing implications for the dominated 610 
comparators 2, 3 and 5. 611 
  612 
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TABLE 613 
Table 1. Validity and uniqueness of objections to the efficiency-frontier approach 614 
Objection 
Step 1: 
Valid for 
EFA? 
Step 2: 
Valid for 
IRP? 
Step 3: 
Valid for 
CET? 
Objections concerning allocation 
1: “does not use explicitly set thresholds” yes yes no 
2: “does not prioritize funds across disease areas” no no no 
3: “does not represent societal preferences or maximum WTP” yes yes yes 
4: “does not ration effective drugs on economic grounds” yes  yes no/yesa 
Objections concerning the comparator 
5: “could be used with an inadequate comparator” yes no yes 
6: “is open to manipulation by adding a ‘meaningless’ alternative to 
the market” 
no yes no 
Objections concerning endpoints 
7: “does not use the QALY as an endpoint” no yes no 
8: “does not use aggregating endpoints” no yes no 
9: “requires cardinally-scaled endpoints” yes no yes 
Objections concerning input parameters (costs, prices, other data) 
10: “does not consider life-cycles of drugs (using historic prices)” yes/nob yes no/yesc 
11: “does not properly acknowledge R&D costs of drugs” yes  yes yes 
12: “could be influenced by altering prices” yes  yes no 
13: “requires data that may not always be available” yes  yes yes 
Objections concerning practical implementation 
14: “assumes constant returns to scale and perfect divisibility” yes no yes 
15: “is too onerous” no no no 
16: “could lead to negative prices if all trade margins are deduced” yes yes no/yesa 
Objections concerning the epistemological roots 
17: “deviates from international health economic standards” no no no 
18: “lacks theoretical embedding in economic theory” no no no 
19: “lacks international debate” no no no 
20: “uses an arbitrary method to inform about uncertainty” no no no 
CET: cost-effectiveness threshold, EFA: efficiency-frontier approach, IRP: internal reference pricing, N/A: 
not applicable, QALY: quality-adjusted life year, R&D: research and development, WTP: willingness-to-pay. 
a: not valid when used as a hard decision rule; valid when used to benchmark (value-based) prices to meet the 
cost-effectiveness threshold. 
b: valid for the initial proposal of using current prices of the comparators; not valid as the initial proposal was 
context-specific and not inherent to the efficiency-frontier approach. 
c: not valid when the value of a threshold implicitly accounts for it (e.g. when based on the costs of patented 
interventions that were previously accepted for reimbursement); valid when not implicitly account for (e.g. 
when based on the value of a statistical life). 
615 
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